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Is the ‘striped’ appearance of the rainbow a construct of our higher mental 
processes, or is it determined at an early perceptual level by the organization of human 
color vision? If your language doesn’t have separate terms for ‘blue’ and ‘green’ (and 
many languages, including Welsh, do not) would you perceive these shades as more 
similar than a speaker of English? Although the nature of the relationship between natural 
language and our mental representation of the experienced world has been probed by 
philosophers, psychologists, linguists and anthropologists in many areas (e.g. number: 
Gumperz and Levinson, 1997, Gordon, 2004; spatial relations: Majid, Bowerman, Kita, 
Haun and Levinson, 2004, Choi, McDonough, Bowerman and Mandler, 1999; time: 
Boroditsky, 2001; shape: Lucy, 1992, Roberson, Davidoff and Shapiro, 2002), the color 
domain has been a principle focus of investigation.  
One reason why so much research has focused on color categorization is that the 
range of colors visible by humans is large (approx. 2 million Just Noticeable 
Differences), but the range of color terms available to describe them is generally small 
(languages contain between 2 and 22 basic1 terms). Not only do some languages have 
gross differences in terminology (e.g. the use of a single term to refer to everything that 
an English speaker would call either blue, green or purple), but even those languages with 
similar color vocabularies have slight variations in the range of stimuli covered by a 
particular term (e.g. the different ranges covered by the English term ‘blue’ and the 
Italian term ‘blu’).   
Another reason why the color domain may be a particularly fruitful ground for 
                                                 
1 The criteria set by Kay, Berlin & Merrifield (1991) for terms considered to be ‘basic’ are terms 
that are monolexemic, present in the ideolect of every observer, not subsumed within the range of 
another term. 
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investigating the relationship between language and thought is that the acquisition of 
color vocabulary by children is typically rather slow and error-prone compared to 
acquisition in other domains (Bornstein, 1985; Au & Laframboise, 1990; O’Hanlon & 
Roberson, 2006). By 2-years-of-age, children can learn a novel category label from a 
single exposure if it is a highly imageable concrete noun (Heibeck & Markman, 1987), 
leaving only the briefest of intervals to study category acquisition. In contrast, children 
may still make color-naming errors at 6-years-of-age (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & 
Shapiro, 2004) so there is an extended period in which the process of color term 
acquisition can be studied. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first sets out the background to the 
debate about the relationship between language and cognition in the color domain. The 
second explains how recent studies of color recognition employing visual search tasks 
have clarified this relationship. This section also argues that these studies point to the 
existence of two separate systems that influence perception and categorization of color, 
one of which is linguistically based and one of which is not affected by language at all.  
The third section critically evaluates recent claims by Kay, Regier and Cook (2005) that 
there are similarities between color terms in the world’s languages that point to the 
existence of color universals.  In the fourth section, we examine children’s color term 
acquisition in an attempt to trace the mechanisms by which color categories are acquired.  
It also discusses whether infants have an innate pre-partitioned organization of color 
categories that is over-ridden during the learning process. In the two final sections, we 
outline some outstanding questions, note some methodological constraints on the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the accumulated evidence and argue that much more 
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empirical investigation is still needed in this field. 
 
Background to the debate. 
Historically, the debate concerning color categorization has been sharply divided 
between what have come to be known as the universalist and the relativist positions. At 
one extreme, the view is that color categories are based on perceptual primitives, given 
either by the visual environment (Shepard, 1992) or by the properties of the human visual 
system (Kay & McDaniel, 1978), and are therefore universal. By contrast, the relativity 
hypothesis emphasizes the role of cultural needs in shaping both language and cognition: 
“the essential idea of linguistic relativity (is) the idea that culture, through language, 
affects the way we think, especially perhaps our classification of the experienced world” 
(Gumperz & Levinson, 1997, p 612). According to relativists, therefore, color categories 
are learned and are likely to vary as a function of cultural and linguistic differences 
(Ratner, 1989). 
The wide variability of color naming that exists in different cultures is clearly 
consistent with the relativist proposal that language can influence which categorical 
distinctions a child comes to develop (Lantz & Stefflre, 1964; Ratner, 1989).  However, 
as we explain later in this section, advocates of the universalist view have contested this 
conclusion by claiming that linguistic color categories and the mental organization of the 
perceived color space can be completely independent of one another (Rosch Heider, 
1972a, 1973; Bornstein, 1985).  
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The relativist2 view of a close link between linguistic categorization and the 
cognitive organization of color was based on the findings of Brown and Lenneberg 
(1954).  They showed that colors that were easier to name in English were easier for 
(English speaking) participants to remember across short retention intervals and easier to 
communicate to others. Brown and Lenneberg, in common with many subsequent 
investigators, believed that memory performance provided insights into the way in which 
color categories are structured in the human cognitive system (we return later to the issue 
of whether this claim is justified). Cross-cultural support for the relativist view came 
from studies that demonstrated a close relationship between memory and naming in other 
languages also (Lantz & Stefflre, 1964; Stefflre, Castillo Vales & Morley, 1966). It was 
concluded that ease-of-naming would be a generally good predictor of memory accuracy 
in all languages across a wide range of color stimuli.   
Berlin & Kay’s (1969) survey of color terms in different languages led them to a 
radically different view. They suggested instead that some ways of organizing colors into 
categories were better than others. They proposed a common evolutionary trajectory for 
color vocabularies with the optimal arrangement as the endpoint. In that case, the number 
of color terms available in different languages reflected the point along that trajectory 
that a particular language/culture had reached. Western languages, like English, had 
reached the endpoint of that evolutionary trajectory and used an optimal set of color 
terms and categories. Pressure for color vocabularies to evolve towards an optimal set 
would arise because all humans shared underlying cognitive representations of the 
optimal organization (black, white, grey, red, yellow, green, blue, pink, purple, orange 
                                                 
2 Often reported as a Whorfian view, following the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) 
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and brown), even if they did not express those categories in their language. This 
organization at a language-independent cognitive level was proposed to be innate and 
hardwired into the organization of color vision pathways (Kay & McDaniel, 1978; 
Bornstein, 1985). Saunders & van Brakel (1997) review these proposals in detail.  
Berlin and Kay’s (1969) hypothesis was supported by Rosch Heider’s studies of a 
small remote branch of a hunter-gatherer tribe, the Dugum Dani (Heider & Olivier, 1972; 
Rosch Heider, 1972a, 1973, 1975).  The Dani used only two basic terms for the whole 
range of visible colors (although Rosch Heider 1972b did in fact suggest that many of her 
Dani participants used additional color terms). Her results indicated that Dani memory 
patterns were not well predicted by their color naming performance. Instead, they showed 
similar patterns of memory for colors to speakers of American English. For example, the 
Dani remembered colors that were good examples of English color categories (e.g. red, 
blue, green etc.) better than colors that were hard to name for English speakers. These 
findings supported the proposal that a particular set of color categories might be 
panhuman cognitive universals that could transcend terminological differences. Under 
this view there could be such large differences between the “structure of the color space 
in memory” and the structure of the lexical categories used to describe them (Heider & 
Olivier, 1972, p. 351) that the two sets (one in language, the other in thought) could be 
effectively orthogonal.  
A complete disconnection of this nature between thought and language would 
have widespread implications for theories of cognition generally. Under such a 
universalist view, no learning or transmission of cognitive color categories would be 
required (since everyone would have the same set from birth). However, speakers of 
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languages that express a different (non-optimal) number of categories would still at some 
point have to learn the appropriate reference set of exemplars for the linguistic terms that 
were used in their culture (Bornstein, 1985).  Nevertheless, it remains unclear how a 
detailed category structure of this nature could be innately specified or how these 
differences between linguistic and cognitive categorization come to exist in certain 
cultures. It is also unclear why even English-speaking children appear to find color terms 
very difficult to learn (Bornstein, 1985) given that their language codes all members of 
the proposed universal categories. 
Moreover, there are empirical as well as conceptual difficulties for this version of 
the universalist position. It is now clear that there are methodological problems with 
Rosch’s experiments with the Dani that make her results difficult to interpret.  Lucy and 
Schweder (1979) noted that the two sets of colors (best examples vs. poor examples of 
English categories) used by Rosch were not equally discriminable because the arrays 
were ordered by hue and brightness. It turned out that the best examples had fewer close 
competitors surrounding them. Garro (1986) repeated Rosch’s experiment with English 
speakers using a randomized array and found that best examples of English color 
categories were still better remembered than poor examples. However these findings left 
unanswered the question of how the Dani would have performed with a randomized 
array.  
In order to investigate this issue further, a new series of investigations was 
conducted that involved adult speakers of two other languages with a small number of 
color terms (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Roberson et al., 2000; Roberson, 
Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro, 2005). Both the Berinmo language, which is spoken in 
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Papua New Guinea, and the Himba language, which is spoken in Northern Namibia, 
contain only five basic color terms compared to the eleven present in English (see figure 
1). When recognition memory for color was examined in both these cultures, Rosch’s 
results were replicated so long as the arrays were ordered by hue and brightness.  
However, when the array was randomized, and the number of close competitors equated 
for the best and poor examples, the Himba and Berinmo no longer showed any memory 
advantage for English best examples. Instead, speakers of each language recognized good 
examples of their own linguistic color categories better than poor examples, regardless of 
these items’ status in English color categories (Roberson et al., 2005). Paired-associate 
learning of colors to pictures of familiar objects also failed to show any advantage for the 
proposed universal prototypical examples in either Berinmo or Himba speakers. A similar 
lack of pre-eminence for this particular set, either in naming or categorization, was 
reported by Jameson and Alvarado (2003) in Vietnamese speakers. These findings show 
that there is no single set of prototypical colors that are universally cognitively privileged. 
Rather, those stimuli that are best examples of an individual’s own named categories are 
remembered more easily than those that are not.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
In a further series of experiments, Roberson et al. (2000, 2005) investigated 
categorical perception (CP) of color in speakers of English, Berinmo and Himba. CP 
refers to the sharp peak in the relative discriminability of colors that cross a category 
boundary compared to discriminability within a color category (Harnad, 1987) so that 
continuous quantitative differences along a continuum come to be perceived as discrete 
qualitative changes at category boundaries. For English speakers, it is claimed that pairs 
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of colors that cross the boundary (e.g. between blue and green) are discriminated faster 
and more accurately than pairs of colors with equal physical separation that are both good 
examples of green or blue.   
The issue that Roberson et al. investigated was whether speakers of Berinmo and 
Himba would show also CP at the boundaries of the English categories green and blue.  
Moreover, would the Berinmo and Himba show CP at category boundaries within their 
own language that do not exist for English speakers. Participants were shown a colored 
target and had to decide which of two stimuli, presented five seconds later, was identical 
to the target. For each language tested, performance was facilitated when the target and 
distractor stimuli had different color names (e.g. in English, a blue target with a purple 
distractor) relative to the same name (e.g. in English, two different shades of blue). The 
results indicated that all three groups of participants showed CP, but only at color 
boundaries that were explicitly marked in their own language.  Crucially, there was no 
effect of the proposed universal boundary between green and blue for speakers of Himba 
and Berinmo whose languages do not make this distinction. 
One criticism that has been made of Roberson et al’s (2000) findings with the 
Bernimo has been that the speakers of this language live close to the equator and that as a 
consequence their eyes may have been prematurely damaged by strong sunlight (UVB) 
(Lindsey & Brown, 2002). As the lens ages, it becomes denser and less clear, a process 
known as ‘brunescence’ which may particularly affect the ability to discriminate colours 
in the blue-green range. Lindsey and Brown gave young adults in the USA observation 
conditions (colored lenses) that simulated lens brunescence in the elderly and found that 
their naming classification of colors in the critical region changed. They suggested that 
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individuals born with an innate boundary between green and blue, such as the Berinmo, 
could fail to distinguish them linguistically because by adulthood they would have lost 
discriminative ability in that region. However, such an argument cannot explain why 
Roberson et al. (2000, 2005) found no evidence of any deficits when they tested the color 
vision of their Himba and Berinmo participants. Hardy, Frederick, Kay and Werner 
(2005) provided the most direct test of Lindsey and Brown’s hypothesis by examining 
older adults in the USA who were known to suffer from lens brunescence. Hardy et al. 
found that color naming for stimuli that were nominally green, blue-green or blue was 
virtually identical for observers with and without lens brunescence when viewing the 
same (unfiltered) stimuli. Thus it seems that the effects of lens brunescence cannot 
explain the differences that Roberson et al. (2000) observed between the performance of 
Berinmo and English speakers.  
 
Recent studies of color categorization in adults. 
Much of the research that we have discussed so far has employed memory tasks to 
investigate the relationship between language and color categorization. In these 
experiments, a strong link between naming and recognition might have emerged because 
individuals chose to rely on verbal coding to retain information about color during the 
retention interval. Even in Roberson et al.’s categorical perception experiments, a color 
had to be held in memory for 5 seconds before the target and distractor items were 
presented.  Consequently, these studies leave open the question of whether linguistic 
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coding affects perception or the ability to retain a color in memory (Munich & Landau, 
2003).  
Gilbert et al. (2006) devised a matching-to-sample visual-search task that appeared 
to make little or no demands on memory to investigate CP for colored targets. 
Participants were told to fixate on a cross in the centre of the computer screen. They were 
then asked to report the location of an ‘oddball’ colored target appearing amongst an 
array of distractors that were identically colored. Participants showed clear evidence of 
CP on this task.  They were faster to detect a difference between the target and 
background when the target and background colors came from different categories (e.g. 
blue target, green background) than when both target and background came from the 
same category (e.g. different shades of blue) even when the amount of physical 
separation between target and background were held constant.  
A critical question is whether CP on this visual search task occurs only at 
boundaries between colors in the putative universal set or whether it also occurs at 
boundaries that are not marked in English. This issue has been recently investigated with 
speakers of Russian by Winawer et al. (2007), and with speakers of Korean by Roberson, 
Pak and Hanley (2008). Winawer et al’s Russian participants showed CP at the boundary 
between siniy (dark blue) and goluboy (light blue), which are distinct “basic” color terms 
for speakers of Russian. English speakers, who would call all these stimuli “blue”, did 
not show the same cross-category advantage.  Roberson et al.’s Korean participants 
showed CP at the boundary between yeondu (yellow-green) and chorok (green), which 
are distinct “basic” color terms for speakers of Korean but not for speakers of English.  
No evidence of CP was shown by native English speakers at this boundary. 
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Because the experimental tasks were not tests of memory, these two studies 
provide a clear demonstration that categorical perception of colors is constrained by 
culture and language. Consequently, these two studies provide overwhelming evidence 
that superior discrimination of stimuli that cross a category boundary (such as that found 
for English speakers at the boundary between blue and green) does not provide evidence 
for a set of universal color categories that are hard-wired in the human visual system. 
CP effects were once thought to reflect low-level visual processing (Bornstein & 
Korda, 1984).  Is it therefore the case that these results mean that linguistic processing 
affects early stages of color processing? Two sets of additional findings have provided 
information about the precise point at which verbal codes influence color categorization 
in this experimental paradigm.  First, Gilbert et al. (2006) and Winawer et al (2007) 
showed that CP was not observed in perceptual tasks when participants carried out a 
concurrent verbal task. Under verbal suppression, all equally-spaced separations of color 
were equally easy to discriminate. Second, Gilbert et al (2006) and Roberson et al. (2008) 
reported that the CP effect was only found for colors that were presented in the right 
visual field, presumed to preferentially access language-processing areas in the left 
hemisphere. No difference between within- and across-category pairings of targets and 
distractors was observed for colors presented in the left visual field, which gains 
preferential access to the right hemisphere. Gilbert et al. (2006) also showed CP was 
found only in the left hemisphere of a patient in whom the corpus callosum, which 
connects the two hemispheres of the brain, had been surgically severed.  
 
Culture, thought and color language 
 
13 
Further evidence that left hemisphere brain regions associated with language 
processing are actively associated with post-perceptual processing of color has been 
provided by a recent fMRI study (Tan et al., 2008).  Easy-to-name colors evoked stronger 
activation in areas associated with language than hard-to-name colors. The authors 
suggest that these results support the rapid automatic activation of verbal color codes 
during perceptual decisions about color.  
It is not hard to produce an explanation of the way in which left-hemisphere 
language processes might produce categorical perception. Let us assume that decisions 
about whether a target and background are the same can be made on the basis of either a 
right hemisphere perceptual code or a left hemisphere verbal code, and that when the two 
codes conflict, accuracy and speed will be reduced.  Automatic activation of color names 
should therefore impair judgments about whether, for example, two different shades of 
blue are from the same category because the linguistic information that they are the same 
will conflict with the perceptual information that they are different.  Decisions for items 
from different categories (e.g. a blue and a green) will be faster and more accurate 
because both linguistic and perceptual codes indicate that target and background are 
different. When the left-hemisphere language system is suppressed by verbal 
interference, or is not accessed because information is presented directly to the right 
hemisphere, the verbal code is not generated and there is never any source of conflict 
with the perceptual code.  Hence there is no advantage for comparisons that fall across 
linguistic category boundaries.  
If this account of categorical perception is true, then it follows that the ability to 
decide whether two colors are different probably depends on right hemisphere processing 
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systems and does not require any form of verbal mediation.  Color categories and color 
categorization, however, are entirely the product of the left hemisphere language system. 
Because verbal and perceptual codes for color are automatically activated relatively 
rapidly, there can be errors if the codes conflict.  But where these two sources of 
information yield congruent information, memory for colored stimuli is good and 
decisions about color can be made accurately and rapidly.   It therefore appears that 
categorical perception of color, contrary to what has often been claimed, does not in fact 
reflect superior discrimination of colors when they cross a category boundary. Instead it 
appears to reflect the fact that decisions about color are hampered when perceptual codes 
and verbal codes are in conflict. This conflict occurs when a task requires that two 
different shades of a primary color must be treated as different even though they share the 
same label. 
 
Are there universal ‘tendencies’ in color naming? 
Recent formulations of the universality hypothesis have acknowledged that 
differences in color category boundaries between languages influence memory for color 
and that linguistic boundaries determine the points at which categorical perception for 
color is observed (Kay et al. 2005). Thus there is now some common ground between the 
universalist and relatativist positions.  
At the same time, however, Kay et al. (2005) still maintain that in different 
languages, there are strong universal tendencies both in color naming and in selection of 
the best examples of categories, which are held to cluster near the prototypes for English 
white, black, red, blue, green and yellow (Kay et al., 2005).  However, in place of the 
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eleven originally proposed universal categories (Berlin & Kay, 1969) recent formulations 
suggest that there are instead universal tendencies in color naming.  For instance, they 
propose that the naming systems of different languages that all use 5 color terms are more 
similar to each other than would be expected by chance. Regier, Kay & Khetarpal (2007) 
suggested that instead of a single optimal system with 11 color terms, there might be 
optimal ways of dividing color space into 3, 4, 5, 6, etc. categories (see also Kay & 
Regier, 2007). They allow that these proposed ‘optimal’ partitions could be based on 
some properties of perceptual color space (Jameson, 2005), on some properties of the 
visual environment  (Yendrikhovskij, 2001, Shepard, 1992), or on socio-linguistic 
negotiation among speakers (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005). They also acknowledge that even 
though the number of the languages surveyed to date are only a tiny fraction of the 6000+ 
languages still extant, many of them fail to fit the proposed optimal pattern.  
There are, however, a number of methodological factors that may have inflated the 
apparent similarity of different naming systems in some investigations (Hickerson, 1971; 
Wierzbicka, 1999; Saunders & van Brakel, 2001). First, the range of stimuli used to 
collect cross-cultural naming data for the World Color Survey (Kay, Berlin & Merrifield, 
1991) contains 320 highly colorful (saturated) stimuli (from the outer ‘skin’ of the 
Munsell sphere) that constrain the possible pattern of color labeling to a fixed set.  Most 
traditional communities, lacking printing and dying facilities, may see such colorful 
stimuli for the first time when naming them for an experimenter. In some cultures 
speakers willingly extend their color terms to all these colors (e.g. Berinmo speakers). In 
other cultures, informants are more reticent, and many stimuli are left unnamed (e.g. 
Himba speakers; many South American informants interviewed by MacLaury, 1997). In 
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addition, the possible extension of their color terms to less saturated stimuli (from the 
inner portion of the Munsell sphere) is rarely explored. Restrictions of the stimulus set 
may have led to an underestimation of the degree to which linguistic categories in one 
language might differ from those in another. In our own studies, the similarity between 
Himba and Berinmo naming patterns for the most colorful stimuli (.61 inter-language 
agreement) does not extend to less saturated stimuli (.27 inter-language naming 
agreement). Himba and English speakers use a large number of secondary terms to label 
less colorful stimuli (e.g. maroon, dun, olive, khaki) while Berinmo speakers readily 
extend basic terms to such stimuli.  
In conclusion, reliance on the naming of only the most colorful stimuli may have 
led, in the past, to overestimation of the similarity of divergent languages’ color term 
systems (Lucy, 1992; Lucy & Schweder, 1979; Saunders & van Brakel, 1997; Levinson, 
2001). A similar observation of the limitations imposed by conducting cross-cultural 
naming studies with a restricted stimulus set is made in regard to cross-cultural studies of 
object naming by Malt, Sloman and Gennari (2003). 
Second, for simplicity, the naming maps commonly produced contain only the 
modal names given, and only those modal terms deemed by the experimenter to be 
‘basic’. Consequently, much individual variation in naming is lost both within and across 
languages. Reporting only modal names reduces the size of cross-linguistic discrepancies 
between areas where name agreement is low or many participants fail to provide any 
name for stimuli (Jameson and Alvarado, 2003). It may also result in routine 
‘regularization’ of large and complex data sets in order to decide which terms should be 
counted as ‘basic’ and included and which should be counted as ‘non-basic’ and excluded 
Culture, thought and color language 
 
17 
(see Saunders & van Brakel, 2001; Lucy, 1997). Indeed, some languages have been 
reported to have no ‘basic’ color terms at all (Kuschel & Monberg, 1974). 
Even if there are genuine similarities between certain color systems, do we really 
need to invoke color universals to explain them? There are obvious cultural factors that 
could explain at least some of these similarities. First, similar cultural needs, such as 
evolutionary pressure for successful frugivory (Sumner & Mollon, 2000; Komarova, 
Jameson & Narens, 2007) could cause some category divisions to be more likely than 
others. The existence of dyes means that certain shades of color can be artificially 
generated much more easily than others, and may be labeled in many languages as a 
consequence.  Second, it is clear that cultural contact between speakers of different 
languages has increased the similarity of the color categorization systems that these 
languages employ.  For example, the introduction of the term ‘burou’ for colors in the 
blue-green range into Herero and subsequently into Himba came directly from the 
German word blau during the time that Namibia was a German colony.   
In conclusion, therefore, we believe that methodological problems with the way in 
which the data have been collected renders unsafe any claim that there are universal 
tendencies that lead different cultures and different linguistic systems to divide up the 
color space in similar ways.  Moreover, if there are genuine similarities between color 
categories in different cultures, it seems quite possible that they can be explained as 
easily by shared culture as by universal properties of the human visual system.   
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Children’s color term acquisition 
A number of recent computational models of color category learning have 
highlighted the importance of communication between agents in establishing an optimal 
set of categories for a perceptual continuum of color (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005; 
Belpaeme & Blys, 2005; Jameson, 2005). These studies have suggested that language 
plays an important role in initially establishing shared categories within a community, 
since simulations of category acquisition without communication among agents fail to 
speedily establish an optimal set.  
Sometime between infancy and adulthood, children acquire a set of color terms 
and this linguistic categorization appears subsequently to influence their judgments of 
color. Given that color terms vary so widely across languages and that this variation has 
such profound behavioral consequences, the question arises as to when and how the 
differences come about. One possibility is that human infants are born with a pre-
partitioned set of cognitive color categories that are universal and innately specified (e.g. 
blue, green, yellow, red and possibly also pink, purple, brown and orange), but that these 
are over-written during development by those categories in current use within the infant’s 
culture and language (Bornstein, 1985). If so, given the evidence we have reviewed from 
color categorization in adults, language learning would appear to completely eliminate 
that original set.   
Bornstein (1985) predicted that acquiring color terms would be more difficult for 
children learning a language in which an innate, hue-based, universal set must be over-
written by a new set, even if the new set contained fewer terms in total. Bowerman and 
Choi (2001) suggested that language acquisition would have to overcome great resistance 
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in order to re-structure mental life, where any robust and pre-potent organization of the 
perceived world exists pre-linguistically. Thus, the acquisition of a new set of named 
categories whose divisions cut across a proposed universal set should show a radically 
different developmental pattern to that of English-speaking children who would only 
have to learn to map appropriate labels to a set of already present cognitive categories.  
Roberson et al. (2004) tested these claims by comparing the color naming and 
memory of young children in the UK who were learning English and children from 
Namibia who were learning Himba. Naming and comprehension were studied 
systematically over a three-year period in order to establish a reliable measure of 
children’s color term acquisition, in speakers of different languages.  They tested 28 
English 3-year-olds before they entered pre-school and, subsequently, through three years 
of formal education. They also tested 63 Himba 3-year-olds, few of whom received any 
formal education during the period of the study. Children’s color term knowledge and 
memory for colors were tested at six-month intervals over three years. The children 
completed a color term listing task (“tell me all the colors that you know”), color naming 
(“what color is this?”), color term comprehension (“can you find a red one?”) and a 
recognition memory task in each of the six testing sessions.  
Despite the considerable environmental, linguistic and educational differences 
between the two groups, the process of color-term learning appeared to be remarkably 
similar in the two groups. There was no predictable order of category acquisition across 
either group, consistent with other recent studies (Macario 1991; Mervis, Bertrand & 
Pani, 1995; Pitchford & Mullen 2001; Shatz et al. 1996). Within each group individual 
children displayed almost every possible order of acquisition and, at the end of the study, 
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there were still some children from both language groups who could not correctly use all 
their color terms (even though the English children had had three years of specific 
instruction).  
In recognition memory, from an initial reliance on perceptual similarity, an 
influence of language categories became evident as soon as children acquired color terms. 
Himba and English children who knew no color terms, showed similar patterns of 
memory errors and, critically, both patterns appeared to be based on perceptual distance 
rather than a particular set of predetermined categories. Of those children knowing one or 
more color terms at the first time of testing, Himba children showed better memory for 
the items that are good examples of Himba, but not of English categories, while English 
children showed the reverse pattern. Such rapid divergence in recognition patterns for the 
two groups, from the time that the first terms are learnt, suggests that color categories in 
both languages are learned using similar mechanisms. These data, like those for adult 
Himba and Berinmo speakers, argue for a pivotal role of language in shaping color 
categorization. Considering the trajectory of color term acquisition in the two cultures, the 
longitudinal results suggested that children continue to refine the range of referents for 
each of their color terms for some years after they first show evidence of term knowledge 
for the best exemplars of categories.  
For both populations, once color terms were acquired, memory performance was 
determined by the number of terms known. Children identified more examples of terms 
that they knew than of terms that they did not know, regardless of the absolute number 
of terms known. Knowledge of even one color term changed patterns of color recognition, 
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and from this point on there were language-dependent differences between the two 
groups. In addition, the type of recognition errors made by each group of children 
diverged over time, so that more errors were made to best examples of the appropriate 
language categories than to other alternatives, even though some items that were best 
examples of a category in one language, were poor exemplars in the other.   
Overall, children from the two cultures seemed to acquire their color terms in the 
same gradual fashion, and knowledge of the appropriate terms influenced memory 
accuracy and memory errors so that the patterns of performance, from a common 
beginning, diverged increasingly over time. There was no evidence that English-speaking 
children learnt their color terms more easily than Himba children, even though the English 
terms map directly onto a proposed innate set. Nor was there evidence that either group 
of children appeared to have a pre-partitioned representation of color at 3-years-of-age, 
before they learn color terms (but see also Franklin et al., 2005). 
Non-human primates have similar wavelength discrimination to humans (Sandell, 
Gross & Bornstein, 1979; Matsuzawa, 1985). So, if there is a set of universal color 
categories, one might also expect to find evidence for their existence in these animals. 
However, a recent study of color discrimination in baboons (Fagot, Goldstein, Davidoff 
& Pickering, 2006) failed to support the hypothesis that color categories are explicitly 
instantiated in the primate color vision system. In a match-to-sample paradigm, in which 
human participants showed a sharp category boundary between blue and green, none of 
the baboons showed any inclination to partition the range of blue and green stimuli on 
which they were trained into two categories despite good color discrimination.  
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Current evidence thus suggests that if there is an innate set of cognitive categories 
that are present in young infants, then a) they are species specific and thus do not result 
from some property of the visual system that is shared with other primates; and b) they 
are not retained once adult linguistic categorization is in place. An alternative possibility 
might be a scenario for color vision similar to that observed for auditory stimuli. In the 
auditory case, infants up to the age of 6 months appear to be sensitive to a wide range of 
categorical differences, including some that are not marked in their native language, such 
as the phonemic distinction between ‘l’ and ‘r’ for Japanese speakers (Werker & Tees, 
1984). Their auditory system becomes selectively tuned to the appropriate categories for 
their native language sometime in the second six months of life. After 12 months of age, 
infants lose the ability to make some distinctions that younger infants make successfully. 
Such a possibility has not yet been investigated in infants with regard to color 
categorization. 
Finally, a number of studies show that children achieve competent use of color 
terms relatively late compared to their acquisition of terms for other dimensions (Andrick 
& Tager-Flusberg, 1986; Mervis et al., 1995; Braisby & Dockrell, 1999; Sandhofer & 
Smith, 2001).  Nevertheless, children appear to understand that color terms form an 
independent lexical semantic category by 2 years of age (Backsheider & Shatz, 1993; 
Sandhofer and Smith, 1999). At this stage, knowledge of color terms seems unrelated to 
the ability to use them.  For example, when asked “tell me all the colors that you know”, 
3-year-old English and Himba children were as likely to list terms that they were unable 
to use correctly as terms that they could use correctly (Roberson et al., 2004). Learning 
color terms may promote selective attention to color, so children only achieve a 
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comprehensive conceptual representation of the color domain after acquiring a sizeable 
color vocabulary (Sandhofer and Smith, 1999). A difficulty in learning the referents for 
novel color terms might arise because the ability to abstract any object properties (color, 
size, form and motion) all develop slowly (Pitchford and Mullen, 2001) or because 
children are predisposed to attend to object shape when interpreting novel object labels 
(Smith, Jones & Landau, 1992; O’Hanlon & Roberson, 2006). Whatever the explanation, 
it is clear that learning the appropriate set of referents for color terms is a more difficult 
task for young children than one might have expected if they were simply learning 
appropriate labels for innately specified universal color categories. 
 
Outstanding questions. 
Although it appears that categorical effects of color in adults depend on access to 
the language system, some studies have reported evidence of categorization of color in 4-
months-old infants. Bornstein, Kessen, and Weiskopf (1976), Catherwood, Crassini, and 
Freilberg (1990), and Franklin and Davies (2004) have claimed that young infants do 
make apparently categorical distinctions of color continua. However, a study by 
Davidoff, Roberson, de Haan and Davies (2005) found no differences in novelty 
preference for changes in color that were either within or across adult category 
boundaries. Much more research is needed to establish why minor changes in 
experimental paradigm produced such different results. If this evidence of pre-
partitioning proves robust, more research is also needed to examine how and why it is 
lost when language is learnt.  
What drives so many different cultures to arrive at even coarsely similar solutions 
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to the problem of categorizing the continuum of visible colors? We should be wary of 
assuming that those similarities that do exist provide evidence for color universals before 
alternative explanations have been fully explored.  If an eventual set of eleven basic 
categories were in some way optimal, why would some cultures maintain a small set of 
linguistic categories in their own language while surrounded by other languages that have 
larger sets? Why would Russians and Koreans develop additional basic color terms 
beyond those used in English? Whatever the origin of the observed differences between 
the color terminologies of different societies, any comprehensive model of color 
categorization needs to explain both the observed similarities and the differences between 
color naming systems. The origins of linguistic color categories in different societies might 
be constrained by either cultural or environmental needs, or both, and both may change, 
over time, in different ways in different communities. For discussion of these issues in 
domains other than color, see Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan (2001), Sera et al. 
(2002) and Wierzbicka (1999, 2005).  
There remain several other outstanding questions that are both fundamental to the 
debate and beyond the scope of empirical investigations to date.  Is the development of 
adult color categorization a unique case? If not, to what extent does it follow a similar 
pattern to other modalities that come to be perceived categorically?  In studies of object 
classification, evidence from cross-linguistic studies best fits a hybrid model in which 
some broad, shared, non-linguistic understanding of a domain combines with varying 
cultural pressures to differentiate particular aspects of a dimension at particular times in 
their history (Malt et al., 2003). Recent computational models of color category 
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instantiation support the view that a combination of shared domain structure (in terms of 
both available learning mechanisms and the range of visible colors in the environment) and 
language is needed to explain shared color category structure. Such a combination of 
factors might lead to differences between linguistic categorization systems that also vary 
depending on the degree (and nature) of interactions between linguistic communities.  
 
Conclusion 
Early research in the field led to the conclusion that there are separate levels of 
categorical representation of color, one cognitive and impervious to language and another 
more superficial linguistic level (Rosch Heider, 1972a; Heider & Olivier, 1972). The 
evidence that we have reviewed in this chapter also points to the existence of distinct 
linguistic and non-linguistic color systems.  However, there is no evidence that the 
linguistic system is in any way superficial. Linguistic categorization in different 
languages and cultures partitions the same range of visible colors in different ways and 
these differences affect decisions about color even on visual search tasks. Evidence 
suggests that categorical effects in color perception and memory occur as a result of 
access to lexical codes for color in adults. Moreover, children appear to acquire adult-like 
patterns of discrimination and memory for color as soon as they learn the appropriate 
color terminology for their language and culture. This argues against the view that 
linguistic categorization of color is superficially overlaid on some more important 
cognitive structure.  
When linguistic categorization is prevented (in adults), or is not yet in place (in the 
case of young children) participants behave as if they perceive an undifferentiated 
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continuum of just-noticeable-differences. There does, therefore, appear to be a separate 
non-linguistic system (possibly in the right hemisphere) that can make extremely fine 
discriminations between colors and decide whether two colors are identical or not. There 
is no evidence that language learning has any effect on the way that this system processes 
color. We do not believe, however, that this system ‘knows’ precise information 
concerning similarities and differences between two shades of color (e.g. that one is 
brighter than another, that one is more saturated than another, or that two different shades 
may share the same name).  We do not believe, therefore, that this is the system that 
makes us see the rainbow as comprising seven distinct colors.  Categorical knowledge of 
this kind is only available to the left hemisphere language-based color system, and people 
with different linguistic categories may well see a smaller or greater number of colors in 
the rainbow as a consequence.    
Theorists who have supported the universalist position in the past now accept that 
linguistic differences between speakers of different languages influence color 
categorization (e.g. Kay et al., 2005). The relativist position has also been modified 
because theorists who support the relativist position acknowledge the existence of a 
separate color processing system that is completely independent of linguistic influence. 
Nevertheless, some important differences still remain between the relativist position that 
has been put forward in this chapter and the universalist position put forward by Regier 
and colleagues in the current volume.  We believe that further investigation of the 
remaining controversial issues is needed.  It is also important that dual process theories of 
color perception of the kind advocated in this chapter are subjected to rigorous empirical 
scrutiny.  The domain of color has been and remains a fruitful ground for examining the 
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relationship between language and thought. Now is not the time to discontinue the debate 
or the investigation. 
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 Figure 1. Distribution of Himba named categories and choices of best exemplar for the 
160 chip saturated array (for 31 observers) compared to those of English and Berinmo 
speakers for the same array. Numbers represent number of individuals choosing an 
exemplar as best example of the category. Dots on English graph represent the locations of 
best examples for English speakers. 
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Figure 1 
Himba naming distribution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berinmo naming distribution 
 9
 8
 7
 6
 5
 4
 3
 2
 5R 10R 5YR 10YR 5Y 10Y 5GY 10GY 5G 10G 5BG 10BG 5B 10B 5PB 10PB 5P 10P 5RP 10RP
Mehi Wor
Nol
Kel Kel
Wap Wap
Mehi
10
  3
  5
 2  3
 1  1
 4
 3  2
 4
 2
1
 2
 1
 1
 3
 2  1
  2
 4  3
5
 1   1
 1
 1
 2
 1
 1
 1
 2
1 1
 8 1  4
4
 2
1
1
11  1 1 1
 7 5  2 4 1  2  2 1  2 1   1 1  1  
English naming distribution  
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
5R 10R 5YR 10YR 5Y 10Y 5GY 10GY 5G 10G 5BG 10BG 5B 10B 5PB 10PB 5P 10P 5RP 10RP
Pink
Red
Orange
Yellow
GreenBrown
Blue
Purple
Pink
Red
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
 9
 8
 7
 6
 5
 4
 3
 2
 5R 10R 5YR 10YR 5Y 10Y 5GY 10GY 5G 10G 5BG 10BG 5B 10B 5PB 10PB 5P 10P 5RP 10RP
Wor
 4
 3
  5
 1
  3  1
 4
 3  2
 4
 2
1
 2
 1
 1
 3
 2  1
 1
 1
  1  1
 1
 1
 1
 1
 1
1
 2
 2
 2  2
 1
1
21  2 1 2
 1
 1  2
 1
 1
  1
 2
1
 1
 dumbu
 1
 1  1
 1  1
 1
 1 2
 2 2  2 5
 1
 1
 2
 1  1
 1
 1
 1
vapa
burou
serandu
zoozu
 
 
 
